Moral Competence and Foundations of Moral Judgment. An Empirical Exploration of Concepts and New Possibilities for Understanding by Popoveniuc, Bogda
39
Ethics in Progress (ISSN 2084-9257). Vol. 12 (2021). No. 1,
Art. #4, pp. 39-58. DOI:10.14746/eip.2021.1.4 
Creative Commons BY-SA 4.0
1. Introduction
The study of the mechanisms of moral judgment is both a challenging and a 
difficult task, as the moral functioning involves the cooperation of complex interrelated 
components. Even the most used and praised cognitive theories on moral judgment are 
based on more comprehensive psychological constructs, which exceeds by far what is 
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Abstract: The present study examines the relation between the moral intuitions proposed 
by the ‘Moral Foundations Theory’ according to J. Haidt and the moral orientations 
in relation with moral competence, as described by the ‘Dual-Aspect Model of Moral 
Behaviour’ according to G. Lind.
It is an empirical exploration of the relation between the five foundational domains (and/
or the corresponding two higher-order clusters) and the moral orientations, as this results 
from the theoretical assumptions of both theories, and the influence on and of the moral 
competence on these aforementioned relations. The shared affective and, at the same time, 
habitual characteristics of moral intuitions and moral orientations, although based on 
different theories (intuitionism, respectively, cognitivism) should converge in a dynamic 
relationship. 
The basic motivation is the need to overcome the affective-cognitive disjunction in the 
study of moral judgment, which is artificial. The human (moral) reasoning is always a 
situated and situating one, in a symbolic narrative universe, in which the cognitive-affective 
dichotomy forms a dynamic unity. This overstated dichotomy is only a methodological 
necessity, but unfortunately hypostasized in an explanatory mechanism that leads to the 
impermissible simplification of the phenomenon that it seeks to understand.
The empirical results confirm the limits of both cognitive and intuitions paradigms and 
advocates for a more nuanced and dynamic approach in understanding the moral judgment 
within a more comprehensive conception on human personality. Finally, the implications 
for the contemporary psychology’ paradigm are discussed.




usually understood by cognition. The neo-Kohlbergian approach is based on moral 
sensitivity – involving perception, sensitivity and interpretation of situations –, the 
moral judgment – related to reasoning, judgment and reflection –, the moral motivation 
–encompassing motivation and concentration –, and the moral character – linked to 
initiation and completion of action (Rest 1983).
The constraints imposed by the contemporary research paradigm, methodological 
limitations and practical aspects make it difficult to verify complex models involving 
emotional, cognitive, value-based and motivational aspects, which involve self-narrative 
building upon a complex fabric of cultural and ideological meanings. For this reason, 
studies on moral judgments are often limited either to highlighting particular components 
of them, or to studying the manifestation of moral behavior in a particular context.
For example, the dominant paradigm in the study of reasoning, judgments, and 
decision-making takes for granted the (conflicting) relationship between affectivity and 
reason. The main line of approach towards moral judgments opposes the emotions to 
reason, and defines the methods of investigation. Depending on the stimulus, the proposed 
prototypical situations highlight one or the other of these dimensions, as they are framed 
within the experiment task (Ellemers, van der Toorn, Paunov, & van Leeuwen 2019). 
The different models of morality that have appeared in the literature over the 
years may be a direct consequence of the different moral situations considered 
by the researchers who have proposed them: observe humans as they try to solve 
complex moral dilemmas, and you are likely to propose a model of morality that 
relies heavily on high-level reasoning; ask them how they feel about disgusting 
immoral acts, and you are likely to conclude that morality is all about gut reactions 
that require little rational deliberation (Monin, Pizarro, & Beer 2007b, 223; see 
also Monin, Pizarro, & Beer 2007a). 
In other terms, the research within the “moral domain” is threatened by the effect 
of the self-fulfilling prophecy phenomenon (Jussim 1986). Studies on the functioning of 
the moral judgment are limited to particular relationships and interactions within these 
complex models. In terms of values, motivations, emotions or attitudes, the problem of 
researching the role of affectivity in relation to moral reasoning and moral judgment has 
certain intrinsic methodological limitations.
Most of the studies do not set out to check this dichotomy from the beginning, 
and, hence, limit ab initio the possibility of identifying more nuanced relationships. Even 
thought, they seem to justify, rather, a perspective based on the idea of continuity between 
“intuition” and “reasoning” as “two facets of the same process which spans from fast, 
immediate, and certain answer to slow, conscious and elaborate judgments” (Dellantonio 
& Job 2012, 241).
The present study aims to highlight possible relationships between intuitive aspect 
(mostly affective, pre- or subconscious, and also involving automatic reasoning) and 
cognitive aspect (which are mostly based on post-hoc conscious reasoning) of the moral 
judgment. The relationship between affectivity (understood as moral intuition) and 
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reason – or the moral reasoning – is not necessarily either disjunctive, or contradictory. 
The gap between theoretical approaches is so big, that it seems they are dealing with 
different phenomena. These heterogeneous perspectives compose a dismantled imagine 
of human moral psychology. The picture of human moral is painted in flashy colors of 
the clashing self-subsistent monolithic and conflicting mechanisms (cognitive, affective, 
motivational etc.). Greene’s theory on moral judgment is reflecting this state of affairs, 
by starkly opposing emotion (through the lens of a deontological-prone judgment) to 
cognition (utilitarian-prone judgments), as “competing subsystems in the brain” (Green 
et al. 2004). The images on moral judgment are inevitably half-done, as the two main 
theories (also used in this study) – the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) and the Cognitive 
Development Theory (CDT) – highlight two partial images on moral judgment:
MFT event → intuition → judgment ↔ post hoc reasoning
CDT event → ? → ante hoc reasoning → judgment
But, if the assumptions of the two models are merged, it can get presumably a better 
image of the moral reasoning, which seems to suggest the following logical flow: 
event → [interpretation (automatic ante hoc reasoning)] → intuitive judgment (affective 
aspect) → [post hoc reasoning (motivated or reflective)] → moral judgment (cognitive 
aspect).
2. Theoretical Background of the Research 
2.1 The Moral Foundations Theory (MFT)
The Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt 2001, 2013; Haidt & Graham 2007; Graham 
et al. 2011) proposes a nativist, intuitionist and pluralistic perspective on morality. 
It starts from the evolutionary premise that there is a nativist pre-organization of the 
human mind that facilitates the acquisition of behaviors, norms and values, which are 
involved in adapting to a set of recurring social problems. They have a vital function of 
controlling and suppressing natural selfishness in order to make social life possible. The 
five main foundations of morality, based on quick and automatic moral intuitions, are those 
related to “harm/care,” “fairness/reciprocity,” “ingroup/loyalty,” “authority/respect,” and 
“purity/sanctity”. The first two foundations collapse in personal-individualizing category, 
as they are oriented on the rights and liberties of all individuals, while the last three 
in group-binding, focusing on the group cohesion). Beside these, the authors have also 
identified other possible candidate dichotomies such as “liberty/oppression,” “efficiency/
waste,” and “ownership/theft” (Graham et al. 2013). I use also the three clusters version 
of collapsing the moral foundations as suggested by the original source of MFT Shweder’s 
(1997) “big three” of morality: autonomy (“harm” & “fairness), community (“loyalty” 
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& “authority”), and divinity (“spirituality”), because the fifth foundation Spirituality is 
heavily loaded with religious significance
The relevance of this theory for the present study is that it highlights the active role of 
the sets of values (rooted in the same moral foundations)  to which the individual adheres 
to, and in relation to the way he or she reasons. In the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, 
the authors use two sets of items. The first set includes relevance-items, which measure 
personal theories (self-theory) about the moral judgment (the perceptions that an 
individual’s has about his own moral values), the second set are judgment-items, concrete 
examples about which individual makes moral judgments.
The relevance-items are formulated abstractly by reference to the group – generally 
family or nation – in order to avoid cultural conflict on certain sensitive issues, e.g., gay 
rights or the right to bear arms. Judgment scales were added to the relevance ones in 
order to minimize the impact of the variation; this was based on the set of answers – e.g., 
a person can consider all aspects as morally relevant – as well as to contextualize the 
abstract items. These items also have the function to balance the differences between the 
explicit self-theories related to how one makes moral judgments with the effective moral 
judgment (Nisbett & Wilson 1977).
2.2 Dual-Aspect Theory of Moral Behavior (DATMB)
Dual-Aspect Theory of Moral Development is rooted in Kohlberg’s cognitive theory 
of moral development. It is based on the principle that moral competence is “the capacity 
to make decisions and judgments which are moral” (i.e., based on internal principles) and 
to act in accordance with such judgments” (Kohlberg 1964, 425). Therefore, one might 
argue that morality cannot be reduced to principles, attitudes, values, intuitions, moral 
stances, but all of these are involved more or less in the moral judgement. However, in 
order to reflect individual’s free-will and deliberate decision, without which the moral 
responsibility is a flatus vocis, the structure or the cognitive scheme is essential to 
underpin the moral orientation. At the same time, affectivity (or emotion) does not come 
as a complementary, opposite or distinct aspect of cognition, but should be conceived 
as the secondary aspect of the moral behavior. Within the theory of the dual aspect of 
moral judgment, proposed by Georg Lind, moral judgment (cognitive dimension) and 
moral orientation (affective dimension) are two aspects, but not components, of the moral 
behavior. Moral competence is nothing but the ability to use consistently and differently a 
certain moral orientation for making moral judgments in different social situations (Lind 
2016). In other words, the “virtue” of self-consistent moral behavior or the verticality 
(read, consistency) of moral character. The more moral I am, the more consistent I am in 
my judgments (and conduct), in various situations, with different actors and regarding 
different deeds.
In the research literature, MFT and CDT are two different paradigms, which reflect 
different psychic phenomena. Whilst MFT aims at the range of social concerns grouped 
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semantically (linguistically) around the term “moral,” CDT aims to capture the end-point 
of a process of developing increasingly differentiated thinking about social issues. “On 
offer, then, are not two functionally equivalent conceptions of the moral domain, but 
two constructs that are doing different theoretical work in very different theoretical 
frameworks” (Maxwell & Beaulac 2013, 378). However, both theories share the same 
assumption, i.e., that affectivity has a well-defined position in moral judgments and this 
study tries to see if they converge in this point, as they should.
3. Literature Review
The viability of my hypothesis was suggested by the few (and) scattered studies 
on this topic. The analysis of the literature suggested the possibility of the existence of 
relations between certain foundations and moral orientations, in relation with the moral 
competence. The link between the moral foundations and the moral competence seems 
to be the most documented, mainly by the negative relationship discovered in several 
studies between social conservatism and the moral competence (measured with either 
DIT2 or MCT: [Emler 2002; Candee 1976; Fishkin, Kenniston, & MacKinnon 1973; Lind, 
Sandberger, & Bargel 1985; Nassi, Abramowitz, & Youmans 1983; Raaijmakers, Verbogt, 
& Volleberg 1998; Simpson 1987]). 
On the other hand, moral competence was found to negatively correlate with 
the “binding” foundations (Graham, Haidt & Nosek 2009). However, comparing the 
populations of America and Israel, Gross (1996) has shown that these differences are 
considerably tempered when education and socioeconomic status are taken into account, 
although the samples are relatively small, four groups of about 50 subjects.
The analysis of the research carried out on this topic led to the identification of 
just three articles that directly address the issue of the relationship between moral 
competence and moral foundations. Investigating the relationship between psychopathy 
and moral orientation, Gay, Vitacco, Hackney, Beussink and Lilienfeld (2018) find a 
positive correlation of moral competence with the foundation of “fairness/reciprocity” 
and a negative one with “ingroup/loyalty” in one study. However, the second study 
finds no correlation and the third study finds only a negative correlation between moral 
competence and the two foundations of “binding” foundations (Gay, Lishner, Vitacco, & 
Beussink 2019). 
The study made by Trups-Kalne and Dimdins (2017) seems to be the only one that 
aims to test directly the relationship between moral foundations and moral orientations, 
and moral competence respectively. obtaining only a negative relationship between moral 
competence and the “binding” foundation. The study also finds a positive correlation 
between the arguments corresponding to conventional stage 3 of Kohlberg’s model 
– based on the appeal on solidarity and group cohesion – and the importance given to 
“binding” foundations. Paradoxically, a negative correlation was noticed between moral 
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competence and “fairness”. Their conclusion was that the rational-cognitive and social-
intuitionist perspectives on moral judgment use different conceptual constructions, the 
only correlations obtained being opposed, overall, to the theoretical predictions.
The present study intends to answer this challenge and to test this connection 
between the two sets of constructs – i.e., the moral foundations and the moral orientations, 
respectively, the moral competence, articulated within two alternative theoretical 
paradigms which investigate the territory of moral judgments/decisions. It aims to 
identify the inter-relations between the aspects of relevance (evaluative, i.e., moral values) 
and the criteria of judgment (moral orientations), which are both related to the capacity 
of moral reasoning, conceived as the level of moral competence. 
The first hypothesis is that the moral competence correlates positively with the 
“individualising” of moral foundations (“harm/care,” “fairness/reciprocity”) and, negatively, 
with “binding” ones (“ingroup/loyalty,” “authority/respect,” and “purity/sanctity”). Given 
that the MCT uses judgment items, the correlations of moral competence with judgment 
subscale should be stronger than that on the relevance subscale.
The second hypothesis is that moral intuitions is related with the moral orientations, 
a relationship moderated by the level of moral competence as it follows: 
(H2.1) The moral orientations corresponding to the conventional stages (3, 4) are in 
a positive relationship with the “biding” foundations; 
(H2.2) The moral orientations corresponding to the postconventional stages (5, 6) 
are in a positive relation with the foundations of “individuality”;
(H2.3) The correlations between moral orientations and the moral foundations as 
measured on the judgment subscale are weaker than the measures on the relevance subscale;
(H.2.4) The predicted patterns of correlations are stronger for higher moral 
competence;
The present study has an exploratory purpose and tone, which is justified partly by 
the lack of substantial investigation of these relations within the present literature.
4. Methodology of the Research 
4.1 Instruments
Many studies have tried to clarify the relationship between values and moral 
judgment using various instruments, i.e., Kohlberg´s Moral Judgment Interview 
(Kohlberg 1981, 1984) or Defining Issues Test (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau 1999), 
and Schwartz´ Personal Values Questionnaire (SPV) (Schwartz et al. 2012) or Rokeach 
Value Survey (RVS) (Rokeach 1973) respectively. So far, the results from these studies 
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proved inconclusive, with some studies showing no influence at all (Gay et al. 2018), or 
displaying weak relations (Ostini & Ellerman 1997), or some partial relations (Helkama 
1982; Diessner, Mayton, & Dolen 1993; Lan, Gowing, Rieger, McMahon, & King 2010). 
Other studies have argued for the existence of the mediating function of values – for 
example, between personality traits, or empathy, and ethical competence (Pohling et al. 
2016), whilst others revealed a more systematic relationship (Lan, Gowing, McMahon, 
Rieger, & Friz 2008).
Moral foundations were measured using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
(MFQ) proposed by Jesse Graham and Jonathan Haidt, which was based on the MFT 
(Graham et al. 2011). Moral orientations and moral competence were measured using 
“Moral Competence Test” (MCT), an instrument developed throughout a 40 years 
period by Professor Georg Lind, based on a “Dual-Aspect Theory of Morality and Moral 
Development” (Lind 2016). 
Although the instruments of measurement used in these studies are not seen as being 
convergent, their shared purpose and complementarity made them useful for constructing 
the research hypotheses, e.g., the consistency discovered between Schwartz’s Personal 
Values Questionnaire (SPV) (Schwartz et al. 2012) and Haidt’s dimensions predict unique 
variance in morality attitudes, behavior, and individual-differences (Feldman 2020). For 
the purpose of my research, I consider that both of these two instruments have managed 
to instill the necessary confidence, which is so important when aspiring to have reliable 
measurements. (In the very recent literature, however, appears studies that question the 
viability of Moral Foundation instrument). The confidence was directly provided by their 
background theoretical assumptions, which considered the intertwined relationship 
between emotion and cognition as key, and how these instruments themselves were 
constructed to allow the observation and consideration of these both components. I have 
therefore chosen these two instruments due of their properties and operational value, 
which make them compatible for the study of the interaction between values (intuitions) 
and moral judgment. 
The MFQ contains two sets of questions: i.e., one based on the assessment of the 
relevance of the five types of foundations and the other being based on the assessment of 
judgments made according to them. On the other hand, the MCT aims at measuring the 
moral competence index, which is based on the assessment of agreement (consistency of 
answers) with arguments corresponding to the six types of moral orientations inspired 
by Kohlberg’s stage model. MCT also aims at identifying the moral orientation preferred 
by the respondent. 
Therefore, although the two instruments are rooted in distinct theoretical traditions, 
they both meet at the level of judgment and in relation to the relevance given to moral 
values. The instruments are complementary in analyzing the image of the interaction 
between values (intuitions)  and judgments, respectively, moral reasoning, although in 
different ways and on different theoretical backgrounds. At the same time, I have tried 
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to investigate whether there was a convergent validity between the moral foundations 
and the moral orientations. According to the theories on which the instruments are based 
on, both constructs share the assumption of the innate-cultivated hybrid character of 
moral judgment. If modular innateness is salient in the case of the MFT, the modular and 
gradually constructed structure of moral orientations from the theory of CDT could be 
naturally promoted by such preparedness. This assumption if (indirectly) tested, can be 
an argument for the convergence of the two theoretical perspectives.
I choose MCT instead of DIT2, because the two instruments measure the affective 
and cognitive aspects in different ways, although in an integrated or even mixed way. 
DIT2 measures how consistently (cognitive aspect) the subject prefers (affective aspects 
of) post-conventional arguments. What is difficult to determine in the case of DIT2 is 
whether this consistency is due to moral development or simply the desire to defend a 
certain point of view, because DIT2 is related to the preference of reasoning according to 
a particular stage (Bataglia, de Morais, & Lepre 2010). By contrast, the advantage of MCT 
in measuring the coherence of answers is that it assesses the capacity for moral reasoning 
independently of the subject’s orientation (Lind 2016), i.e., it measures the ability to 
manage the task of differentiating the quality of arguments regardless of the preference 
for one action or another (Ishida, 2006).
For both instruments, the official Romanian translations indicated by their 
respective authors were used. In the case of MFQ, the version translated by Oana Luiza 
Rebega and Irina Pitică, Livia Apostol (retranslation) from the https://moralfoundations.
org/questionnaires/ was applied, and for MCT it was used the Lind-Chicu (2004) version, 
provided by its author.
4.2 Research design and procedure
The study was exploratory, transversal, comparative – i.e., gender, level of education 
– and correlational – i.e., factors from MFQ and MCT, while the selection of the sample was 
non-probabilistic.
The two questionnaires were applied on a number of 982 students during class hours, 
under supervision, during 2019. The questionnaires were applied anonymously (coded) 
by their teachers, as a practical application of theories thought on classes. The participants 
have received activity points for their voluntary participation, and were informed by 
further use of the data. The data was analyzed according to authors’ instructions: those 
respondents who failed the two dummy questions for MFQ and those with less than one 
missing answer for MCT were excluded. In order to ensure a better relevance of the data 
that could have been strongly distorted by the age difference, the answers of the middle 
school students were not retained for the analysis, these being used later for the validation 
of MCT and comparative analyses. The final database included 739 subjects: 509 (68.87%) 
female, 230 (31.12%) male, age 14 to 54 years (94% 15 to 25 years, M = 19.34, SD = 5,232), 
education level: 452 (61.25%) high school students, 287 (38.8%) university students.
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5. Research Results 
For MFQ, the results of Romanian students were significantly higher scores than 
those of American original study in the evaluation of moral foundations, both globally and 
on the two subscales, especially on “biding” foundation. Female subjects higher average 
scores than male subjects on all moral foundations (have statistically significant, excepting 
“in-group/loyalty” foundation), and their scores were higher also on both sub-scales. At 
the same time, the subjects have higher score on judgment subscale than on relevance 
subscales all foundations. Comparing the scores of high-school and university students, 
the same tendency was noticed, the university students having significantly higher scores 
on all moral foundations.
These results were consistent with those obtained for moral orientation scores 
assessed by MCT: the high school students had statistically significant lower scores than 
that of the university student population. An unexpected result was the statistically 
significant lower score at moral competence for the university student population than 
for the high school students, the average difference being 3.8 points (Mhighschool = 22.0, SD = 
15.03 compared to Muniversity = 18.2, SD = 12.98). In other words, university students have 
higher moral orientations and higher scores on all moral foundations, but lower levels of 
moral competence.
In the case of female subjects, the difference of moral competence C-index is even 
more statistically significant from high school to university, with an average decrease of 
4.3 points from 21.8 to 17.5, from high school to university, compared to only 2.9 points 
for male subjects (from 22.5 to 19.6). 
According to the initial hypothesis, the analysis of the correlations between the 
moral orientation and the moral foundations (Kendall’s tau_b two-tailed) shows a slight 
positive correlation with the “individualizing” foundations (τ = .048, p = .042, 1-tailed). 
In addition, those with moral orientations corresponding to stages 1 and 2 are receptive 
only to the foundations of the “community” (“loyalty” and “authority”), those from level 3 
onwards being receptive to all 5 moral foundations (Table 1).
O M.O.
Moral orientations
Orient 1 Orient 2 Orient 3 Orient 4 Orient 5 Orient 6
Moral foundation 5 factors
Care .028 .018 -.004 .065* .075** .090** .121**
Fairness .042 .019 .013 .083** .067* .095** .139**
Loyalty -.005 .062* .064* .111** .100** .090** .112**
Authority .001 .102** .067* .075** .060* .051 .077**
Purity -.008 .035 .075** .073** .073** .069** .089**
 2 factors
Individualizing .048 .023 .004 .085** .077** .106** .151**
Biding -.009 .079** .088** .102** .094** .093** .112**
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Progressivism .059* -.058* -.088** -.027 -.024 .034 .013
3 factors
Autonomy .048 .023 .004 .085** .077** .106** .151**
Community -.005 .096** .078** .106** .093** .081** .105**
Divinity -.008 .035 .075** .073** .073** .069** .089**
Kendall’s tau_b two-tailed 1
  * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
Note: M.O. – moral orientation
Table 1: Correlations between Moral Foundations and Moral Orientations.
This observed correlations’ pattern is more obvious in terms of relevance sub-
scales than the judgment ones in the case of the five foundations (except for “pu-
rity”). The preference for “autonomy” foundations is consistent with increas-
ing moral orientation, whilst those in moral stages 3 and 4, corresponding to 
conventional level of moral orientation, are mostly receptive to “solidarity” foundations.
The analysis of gender differences shows a much greater consistency in the use of the 
five moral foundations for female subjects (in particular, to female high school sub-
jects, i.e., higher moral competence), compared to male subjects where this consisten-
cy has not been manifested more than in the case of the last two moral orientations.
This result is supported by the education level analysis where the consistency in the 
use of all five moral foundations is found in high school students (with higher mor-
al competence score), but not in university students (lower moral competence score).
In order to have a better image of the correlations between the moral foundations and 
the moral level the moral orientations was grouped on the three original foundations 
on which they were built, i.e. the preconventional, the conventional and the postcon-
ventional level. The analysis of the correlations with the moral foundations highlights 
the fact that the preconventional level does not correlate with the person-centered 
moral foundations (“harm” and “fairness,”) instead they are more oriented towards 
the foundation of “authority” and “loyalty”. Conventionally-oriented people are also 
more receptive to the aspects of “solidarity,” while those who prefer post-convention-
al orientations are receptive to both sets of values  (“individualization” and “solidarity”) 
in a greater extent, to the fundamentals of the latter (“harm” and “fairness”). Table 2 
shows the correlations between moral foundations and the level of moral orientation.
Moral orientation level
Moral level Preconventional Conventional
Postconven-
tional
Moral foundations 5 factors
Care .030 .011 .090** .125**
Fairness .047 .018 .089** .142**
1  The Kendall’s τb test was preferred over the Spearman’s rank correlation ρ because in the 
literature there are opinions that claim that it would perform better on larger samples (see Zar 
1996, 392).
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Loyalty -.010 .072** .130** .109**
Authority -.004 .099** .091** .074**
Purity -.007 .066* .089** .086**
 2 factors
Individualizing .051 .016 .100** .154**
Biding -.008 .098** .124** .113**
Progressivism .074* -.088** -.034 .035
3 factors
Autonomy .051 .016 .100** .154**
Community -.010 .101** .127** .103**
Divinity -.007 .066* .089** .086**
Kendall’s tau_b two-tailed 
  * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
Table 2: Correlations between Moral Foundations and Moral Level. 
The correlations between moral foundations and the level of moral orientation are stronger 
in the case of those with a high level of moral competence than in the case of those with a low 
level of orientation, which is an indication that the relationship between intuitive founda-
tions of moral judgment and moral orientations is influenced by moral competence. Table 
3 compares the correlations between moral foundations and the level of moral orientation.
C-index<20 C-index>20
Mlevel Prec. Conv. Postc. Mlevel Prec. Conv. Postc.
Moral 
foundation 5 factors
Care ,011 ,012 ,080* ,087* ,061 ,015 ,104** ,193**
Fairness ,034 -,001 ,095** ,128** ,084† ,029 ,091* ,194**
Loyalty ,017 ,042 ,084* ,073* -,048 ,111** ,190** ,169**
Authority -,025 ,046 ,061 ,055 ,055 ,142** ,142** ,153**
Purity -,009 ,053 ,090** ,060† ,011 ,054 ,092* ,151**
 2 factors
Individualizing ,030 ,005 ,091** ,113** ,092† ,025 ,117** ,235**
Biding -,004 ,063† ,100** ,083* ,004 ,125** ,159** ,187**
Progressivism ,079* -,048 -,006 ,049 ,058 -,114** -,068† ,005
3 factors
Autonomy ,030 ,005 ,091** ,113** ,092† ,025 ,117** ,235**
Community -,005 ,056† ,087** ,077* -,003 ,144** ,189** ,173**
Spirituality -,009 ,053 ,090** ,060† ,011 ,054 ,092* ,151**
Kendall’s tau_b two-tailed 
  * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
† Correlation is significant at the 0,05 (1-tailed)
Note: Mlevel – moral level, Prec. – preconventional, Conv. – conventional, Postc. - postconventional
Table 3: The relationship between moral foundations and the level of moral orientation according to the 
level of moral competence.
Bogdan Popoveniuc
50
Regarding moral competence, the analysis showed negative correlations with the 
foundation of “authority” and “purity” / “spirituality,” “biding” and “community” and 
positive with “progressivism”. These correlations, as was hypothesised, were due only to 
the scores on the judgment sub-scales (on relevance sub-scale no significant correlation 
was found), which were statistically significant along the lines of “authority”, “purity”, 
“solidarity”, and “community”.
For female subjects, only a positive correlation was found between moral 
competence and “progressivism” and a negative with “authority,” and for male subjects – 
negative correlations with “authority” and “purity”.
For high school students only “progressivism” correlated positively, but in a slight 
way, with the index of moral competence, and for university students there was a negative 
correlation with “purity”.
Regarding the differences in the use of moral foundations according to the moral 
competence index (C-index), the analyses showed statistical differences only in the case 
of the “authority” foundation where those with low index appeal to a greater extent (MClow 
= 2.89 compared to MChigh = 2.78).
Regarding the level of education, the only statistically significant difference was the 
one related to the “purity” / “spirituality” foundation in the case students (MClow = 3.12, 
MChigh = 2.83). 
The correlations between moral foundations and the level (low or high, cut-off point 
C-index = 20) of the moral competence index according to the level of moral orientation, it 
was also analyzed. It was found a relationship between the level of moral competence and 
the tendency of subjects – with conventional and postconventional moral orientations – to 
use more consistently all five moral foundations. The analysis of the correlation patterns 
on the two subscales (relevance and judgment) reveals that those with conventional and 
postconventional moral orientations and high index of moral competence display higher 
correlations between orientations and judgments, compared to those with low index of 
moral competence.
6. Discussion
Being mostly an exploratory study, extensive analyses were performed, beyond the 
initial hypotheses that were suggested by theoretical claims and the previous few studies. 
The aim was to make visible the more nuanced and subtle possible relations between 
the structure of moral intuitions and the moral orientations, in relation to the moral 
competence. 
For the Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment, moral intuitions are automated 
moral judgments, laden with affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike) and opposed to 
conscious and intentional process of reflective deliberation of moral reasoning (Haidt 
2001, 818). 
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For the Dual Aspect Model of Moral Behavior, the moral orientations and the moral 
judgment are aspects of the moral behavior, not components, as suggested by Lind (2016, 
51). Moral intuitions and the moral orientations seem to share both emotional roots 
and cognitive schema, which are unconscious and automated. Even though the trends of 
correlations were low, they were in line with the predicted second hypothesis. From the 
perspective of a “bijective” correlation, the first hypothesis is confirmed only partially. There 
were negative correlations between the level of moral competence and foundations and a 
negative correlation with those of “solidarity”, “authority” and “purity”. These correlations 
were due exclusively, as theoretically predicted, to the subscales of the judgment. This 
represents a supporting argument for the convergence of the measurements of the two 
instruments. On the other hand, there was no correlation between moral competence and 
the foundations of “individualisation” (“care” & “correctness”) neither globally, nor on the 
two sub-scales (relevance, respectively judgment).
The second hypothesis was largely confirmed. Moral competence has a weak 
moderating effect on correlations between moral foundations and moral orientations, 
according with the predicted pattern. The moral orientations corresponding to the 
conventional level correlate most strongly with those of the “solidarity” foundations, and 
those corresponding to the postconventional level with the “individualisation” foundation. 
This is in agreement with other studies in the field; see, for example, Glover et al. (2014). 
The difference from previous studies was that correlations were identified at all stages 
corresponding to the conventional and postconventional moral level.
The moral competence correlates negatively, but only with the subscale of judgment, 
for the foundations of “authority” and “purity” of MFQ. As we have seen, the subscales 
of the “relevance” of MFQ is closer to the explicit reasoning within moral reasoning, 
expressing self-theory or second-order opinion about the criteria underlying one’s own 
moral judgment or how people believe that moral judgments are, and because of this 
are affected by subjectivism and self-image. This would be an indication that maturation, 
unaccompanied by a development of moral competence, can lead to a dissociation 
between moral self-image and moral character.
On the other side, the results are promising because they suggest the possible 
inappropriateness of “bijective modular approach” on moral judgment mechanisms and, 
especially, of the relations between moral intuitions (emotion and unconscious reasoning) 
and moral reasoning.
The extensive analysis of the relations between the moral orientations and the 
moral foundations allowed exploring possible more complex relations than the “modular” 
ones (1 to 1 types), between these constructs within the moral judgment. The results 
support a new hypothesis, contrary to the one argued by Trups-Kalne & Dimdins (2017), 
who claimed that due to the increase in analytical complexity, an impairment of moral 
competence is manifested. My findings suggest that it seems that those with high moral 
competence are more able to operate consistently (principally) with all types of values/
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intuitions and not vice versa. Indeed, the MFQ hypothesis, by itself, is not “an adequate 
measure to capture a more advanced moral functioning” as Glover et al. (2014) claims. It 
is not, also, representative at all for those at the preconventional and conventional stages 
of the development of moral judgment, as Maxwell and Beaulac (2013) argue.
It seems that the conclusions of the aforementioned studies are the result of 
“Procrustean bed” of moral psychological research, which neglect or diminish the 
relevance of semantic dimension of moral reasoning. One of the main shortcomings of 
mainstream cognitive theories on moral judgment is the dichotomy, in fact, antinomic 
perspective on conscious/unconscious, intuition/cognition, reason/emotion. The moral 
intuition is definitely more than automatic emotional reaction and comprise more 
cognition (heuristics) than most of the perspectives suggests. (Dubljević & Racine 2014) 
The other limitation is the negligible value assigned to the semantic aspects. The semantic 
intervenes at the level of reasoning (Stenning & van Lambalgen 2004) and emotional 
arousal or trigger.2
As it was proposed by Bucciarelli, Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2008), the 
moral affective-cognitive hybrid functioning must not be so coherent and structured as 
the researchers are trying to make evident. Firstly, they said, there is no necessarily a 
single criterion of choosing moral propositions from a deontic set of moral principles. 
Secondly, the mechanisms underlying emotions and deontic evaluations could be very 
well independent and operate in parallel, and, consequently, some scenarios can elicit 
emotions prior to moral evaluations, with some other eliciting moral evaluations prior 
to emotions, and some eliciting them at the same time. Thirdly, the deontic evaluations 
seem to depend on inferences, either unconscious intuitions or conscious reasoning. And, 
forth, it is not necessary that a person’s beliefs about what is, or isn’t, moral to be either 
complete or consistent.
As Dellantonio and Job (2010) claim, the moral reasoning consists in specific 
operations not only with the concepts, but mostly on the features, from which these 
concepts are made of. There seems to be a semantic difference between the Externalized 
Semantics – conventional and the public dimensions of concepts, which are acquired 
through language and socialization, and are “characterised by rules whose aim is to 
assure the possibility of intersubjective communication” (Dellantonio & Job 2010, 507) 
and Internalized Semantics – or how information is used by people use (internally, i.e., in 
their mind) “to carry out categorizations and to understand the linguistic meaning”. These 
two semantics come along with their own negative or positive value, and correspondingly 
2  For example, in this research were a high rate of responses under cut-of value for the second 
dummy question of Moral Foundation Questionnaire (“Whether or not someone was good at 
math”). In the Romanian version, the term “right” from the questionnaire question “When you 
decide whether something is right or wrong…,” translated as “correct” has its primary sense as 
“according to the rules in general”, and its secondary one emphasis its moral meaning, which 
seems to be the other way around in comparison to the English meaning for “right”. This became 
obvious when some subjects were questioned about their answer and they mentioned that they 
have thought it is important to have a developed mathematical, logical ability in order to make 
something right (“correct”).
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emotions, which can be similar or not. 
7. Limitations 
The Moral Competence Test passed all three psychological criteria of validity: (1) 
the six type of moral orientations were preferred in a increased order, (2) the parallelism 
between moral competence and type of moral orientations, and (3) the correlations 
among the preferences for the six types form a simple structure (Lind 2016). On the 
other side, the major limitation of the study was the low performance on the studied 
population of MFQ, which displayed only a low model fit. This could be the result of the 
authors’ strategy for constructing the instrument by focusing on capturing different 
(theoretical possible) facets of each foundation with the risk of having dissimilar items 
that correlate moderately, as opposed to achieving high internal consistency (Graham 
et al. 2011). The very recent analyses increasingly reveal the necessity to amend and 
improve such instruments for measuring moral values particularly in intercultural 
research. A systematic content analysis of 539 studies (Tamul et al. 2020, in press) reveals 
that the mean Cronbach’s alpha scores for four of the five subscales of Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire were below 70. Other studies on the 27 countries spanning the five largest 
continents found that it is difficult to replicate the five-factor model across a wide variety 
of populations (Iurino & Saucier 2020). My own analysis – which is in progress – does 
suggest that most of the studies take its psychometric properties for granted.
Other possible limitations could result from the application of the questionnaire 
during class hours. This could contribute to a certain “framing” of the data, given that 
the power dynamics in the classroom present certain particularities; the answers of the 
subjects are susceptible to be influenced by the context, the presence of the tenured 
teacher, the unexpected character of the task, etc. 
 8. Conclusions 
There is a concordance, although not powerful, between moral foundations, as 
measured by MFQ, and moral orientations, assessed by MCT. At the same time, the level of 
moral competence acts as a moderating factor of this correlation between intuitions and 
orientations. Those people with higher moral competence, i.e., ability to judge consistently 
with a given set of moral principles, are able to employ more consistently their (educated) 
moral intuitions. The development of moral cognition is governed by higher schema and 
the concordance with triggered intuition is moderated by the general level of moral 
competence. Moral reasoning is not necessarily parallel with the moral intuition. People 
have the power to educate their moral intuitions, not only to construct moral judgments 
on top of them. Moral intuitions are rationally amenable and the patterns for automatic 
judgment foundation could be shaped by episodes of rational reflection (Sauer 2017).
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Moreover, the study suggests a possible explanation for a possible theoretical 
outcome steaming from how the Moral Competence Test was designed, but which 
was not found in empirical data, i.e., the possibility of obtaining consistent judgments 
on low levels of moral orientation. The empirical research showed that this case is not 
common at all, but there was no explanation why this is happening. My study suggests 
that is possible that the individuals with low levels of moral orientation are unable to 
use consistent values/intuitions in their moral judgment. Their axiological reasoning is 
conjectural; they have no consistent moral system or perspective on their experience. 
They interpret and employ values/intuitions in their moral judgment according to their 
motivated reasoning and not as fixed fundamental criteria for judgment. They have no 
commitment for a certain type of values and judge using any intuitions at hand.
Finally, the results corroborate with those of Stenning and van Lambalgen suggesting 
that “«massive modularity» in cognition should be treated with some skepticism” 
(Stenning & van Lambalgen 2004, 523). The striving to discover innateness, substantial 
modularity and distinct mechanisms, in moral judgment and reasoning blow in the wind 
while the cognitive functioning could be more dynamic and hybrid than it is thought. 
The ability to judge according to higher stages of cognitive moral development does not 
mean that people will judge each time and/or exclusively in this manner regardless of the 
context, the experience, motivation, actors, and the particular situation, all influencing 
moral judgment strategies. 
The meta-theoretical assumptions underlying the research in moral psychology are 
essential for the success of research programs. For reasons of convenience and congruence 
with methodological constraints of cognitive paradigm, the main research programs 
work predominantly with a narrow conception of the ethical domain divided between 
deontological versus utilitarian ethics. But there are other meta-ethical paradigms, as 
is the virtue ethics. This paradigm, consonant with the image of moral judgments as 
educated intuitions mentioned earlier, can be more suitable to explain human moral 
behavior, because this paradigm seems to be able to manage diverse situations with 
high ethical complexity without appealing to fixed specific rules. Of course, the virtue 
ethics is intrinsically related to personality, and it conceived as an organic whole and 
as an enterprise, which could mean that the very personality traits model would need 
to be enriched. Beside “dispositional traits” of well-established Big Five Model, the new 
one has to take into account, “individual’s unique variation” on the general evolutionary 
design, “characteristic adaptations” and, most of all, “self-defining “life narratives”, which 
are complexly and differentially situated in culture and social context (McAdams & Pals 
2006). This can explain why moral values are hardly generalizable in various cultures, 
although theories are found to be universal. “The processes that underlie moral cognition 
may not be a human universal in any simple sense, because moral systems may play 
different roles in different cultures” (Sachdeva, Singh, & Medin 2011).
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Only such comprehensive model seems to be able to accommodate appropriately 
the intuitions (rooted in the human evolutionary design), the moral orientations (derived 
from characteristic adaptation), the moral reasoning (influenced by self-narrative 
“complexly and differentially situated in culture and social context”) in a more accurate 
image of what it is human moral psychology. The scientific paradigms are lenses for our 
eyes, which can re-present reality only in the way they are capable of. Therefore, there 
is a necessity to critically examine, not only the theory, instruments and methodology, 
but also the meta-theory which underlies the very research paradigm. Only in this way, 
scientific knowledge can provide a rich and appropriate image of the complex tri-unitary 
phenomenon which is the human being (Popoveniuc 2017). 
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